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Neurohype and the Law: A Cautionary Tale 
Stephen J. Morse 
 
 Many people think that neuroscience based on non-invasive brain imaging will 
transform how we view ourselves and our institutions, such as the law. Take for example 
the following editorial statement published in The Economist back in 2002. 
‘Genetics may yet threaten privacy, kill autonomy, make society homogeneous 
and gut the concept of human nature. But neuroscience could do all of these 
things first.’1  
But neither genetics nor any other science that was predicted to revolutionize society and 
the law has had this effect. Neuroscience, which is simply the newest science on the 
block, is unlikely to produce the results The Economist fears, at least for the foreseeable 
future. At most, in the near to intermediate term, neuroscience may make modest 
contributions to legal policy and case adjudication. Nonetheless, there has been irrational 
exuberance about the potential contribution of neuroscience, a phenomenon I refer to as 
‘Brain Overclaim Syndrome’.2 3 Although I have prescribed a safe, effective, inexpensive 
treatment for this dire condition—‘Cognitive Jurotherapy’—which simply requires 
learning the limitations of neuroscience and the conceptual relation between neuroscience 
and law, the disorder persists.  
  The reasons for neurohype are conceptual and empirical. Let’s begin with the former. 
Law and neuroscience do not use the same language. Thus, there will be problems of 
translation.4 The law speaks the language of “folk psychology,” the psychology we all use 
to explain our own behavior and the behavior of others in terms of mental states like 
desires, beliefs, intentions, and reasons. For example, the explanation for why you are 
reading this chapter is, roughly, that you desire to learn something about the relevance of 
neuroscience to law, you believe that reading this chapter might help achieve that goal, and 
thus you formed the intention to read it and you are now doing so. Legal rules are primarily 
about acts and mental states and are addressed to rational creatures who can be guided by 
rules.  
  In contrast, neuroscience is a mechanistic science that speaks the language of 
mechanism and in principle avoids folk-psychological concepts and discourse (although 
neuroscientific articles are rife with dualistic discourse5). Neurons, neural networks, and the 
brain’s connectome (see chapter ##) do not have reasons. They have no aspirations, no 
sense of past, present, and future. They do not “do” things to each other. These are all 
properties of people. Brain images cannot tell us the reasons for a person’s actions. 
Can we bridge the chasm between the law’s folk psychology and the mechanistic nature of 
neuroscience? This is a familiar question in the field of mental health law, but there is even 
greater dissonance when considering the relation of neuroscience to law. Psychiatry and 
psychology sometimes treat people as mechanisms but also treat them as agents. 
Consequently, these disciplines are in part folk psychological, and the translation to law is 
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easier than it is for neuroscience, which is purely mechanistic. Those claiming the 
relevance of neuroscience should always be able to explain precisely how neuroscientific 
findings, assuming that they are valid, are relevant to a legal issue.  
  Before turning to the current relation of neuroscience to law, let us quickly dispose of 
two “radical” challenges to law that neuroscience poses but that have had no legal purchase. 
The first is the belief that if determinism is true, which neuroscience allegedly proves, then 
responsibility is impossible. And yet, free will is not a criterion of any legal doctrine and is 
not even necessary to justify present doctrines of criminal responsibility.6 Nonetheless, 
believing that no one is ever responsible for anything would upend criminal law and much 
of human interaction as we know it. No science can prove the truth of determinism, however, 
and there are good philosophical answers to the claim that determinism is incompatible with 
responsibility. “Neurodeterminism” is no more persuasive than all the other deterministic 
claims based on other sciences.  
  The more radical challenge is that neuroscience proves that we are just a pack of 
neurons or that we are simply victims of neuronal circumstances.7 If this is true, we are less 
than simply not responsible; we are not agents who act for reasons. Mental states are just the 
foam on the neuronal wave. They exist but do nothing. This is a transformative claim, but on 
both conceptual and empirical grounds, there is simply no reason at present to believe that 
our mental states play no causal role in explaining behavior. Agency is secure. 
The brain does enable the mind and action, although we do not know how this occurs.8,9 
Facts we learn about brains in general or about a specific brain could in principle provide 
useful information about mental states and about human capacities in general and in specific 
cases. Some believe that this conclusion about the potential relevance of neuroscience is 
unwarranted. For the moment, let us bracket this pessimistic view and consider the relevance 
of neuroscience to resolving questions of criminal responsibility and other legal issues once 
the findings are properly translated into the law’s folk psychological framework. 
Our question is whether some concededly valid neuroscience is legally relevant. 
Biological variables, including abnormal biological variables, do not per se answer any legal 
question because the law’s criteria are behavioral—acts and mental states—and not 
biological. For example, even if a brain abnormality such as a tumor played a causal role in 
explaining a criminal defendant’s behavior, it does not follow that a behavioral excusing 
condition, such as lack of rational or self-control capacity, was present. Any legal criterion 
must be established independently, and biological evidence must be translated into the law’s 
folk-psychological criteria.  
The advocate for using the data must be able to explain precisely how the neurodata 
bear on the legal question in issue, such as whether a criminal defendant killed intentionally 
or whether the defendant was severely mentally disordered at the time of the crime. Does the 
tumor, for example, help confirm that the defendant’s claim of mental disorder is true and 
how does it confirm it? If the evidence is not directly relevant, the advocate should be able 
to explain convincingly the chain of inference from the indirect evidence to the law’s criteria.  
 Now let’s turn to the empirical problems. The potential usefulness of neuroscience to 
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law faces two major obstacles in addition to the problem of translation previously discussed. 
Despite the astonishing advances, behavioral neuroscience is not as advanced as we might 
hope. More directly relevant, there is a dearth of legally relevant studies. We shall discuss 
these two problems in order.  
Space precludes detailed analysis of the general scientific difficulties, but the following 
considerations, discussed at length elsewhere,10 are important. Once again, we do not 
understand how the brain enables the mind and action. This does not present an 
insurmountable hurdle to good research, but it does hinder it. Most studies involve too few 
subjects to have sufficient statistical power and this casts doubt on the reproducibility of the 
results (see chapter #sample-size#). Research design in behavioral neuroscience is 
particularly difficult and often makes clear inferences from results problematic. There are 
many response biases and artifacts (uncontrolled for variables) and more are constantly being 
identified. Most of what we know is correlational and coarse, rather than causal and fine-
grained. The ability to generalize from laboratory findings to real world behavior--ecological 
validity--remains unclear. Performance on artificial tests in a scanner may not predict how 
people would behave in the rough and tumble world. The standard subjects of behavioral 
neuroscience studies are college students, who are hardly representative of the population 
generally or of, say, criminal offenders.  
Finally, and perhaps most importantly for the law, there are few replications of studies. 
We cannot be sure that results are certain even if an individual study seems valid. There is a 
“replication crisis” in medicine and the social sciences and behavioral neuroscience is no 
exception (see chapter #rep-crisis#). Lack of replications is particularly important for law 
(and medicine), which have such profound effects on people’s lives. We don’t want legal 
policy made or individual case outcomes affected by science that is quite uncertain. We 
certainly don’t want a criminal defendant to be convicted and punished, or acquitted for that 
matter, based on the finding of one study. 
None of these scientific concerns is surprising. Neuroimaging for general research is an 
infant science working on one of the hardest problems known to science, the relation of the 
brain to mental states such as intentions and to action. The proper methodologies are a work 
in progress. Many of these problems may be solved or substantially ameliorated in the future. 
For example, as the cost of imaging decreases, studies will be able to enroll more subjects. 
But many of these problems, such as the difficulties with inferences and the correlational 
nature of the research, will remain and present challenges. 
The second major problem is that few studies have been addressed to normative legal 
questions, such as the nature of mental states that should ground culpability. In a recent 
review, an eminent neuroscientist and I reviewed all the behavioral neuroscience that might 
possibly be relevant to criminal law adjudication and policy. With the exception of studies 
of a few well-characterized medical conditions, such as epilepsy, that did not employ 
functional magnetic resonance imaging or other new techniques of non-invasive brain 
imaging, our review found virtually no solid neuroscience findings that were yet relevant.11 
Similar conclusions were reached after reviewing “brain reading” studies (e.g., “neural lie 
detection”)12 and neuroimaging research on addiction and criminal law.13  
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There are some exceptions to this gloomy picture. Researchers have already carried 
out a few legally-relevant, “proof of concept” studies about using neural variables to 
predict criminal re-offending14 and to identify legally-relevant mental states.15 There are 
ongoing studies of potentially objective neural measures of how much subjective pain a 
subject is experiencing. This is of profound importance because the law’s system of 
compensation in personal injury cases awards damages for pain and suffering based on 
mostly subjective assessment.16 None of these studies or research projects is ready for 
practical use, but they do give a hint about the modest contributions that neuroscience may 
make to law in the near or medium-term future.  
Let us conclude with an observation that will always be germane even if 
neuroscience makes huge leaps forward. For the law, actions speak louder than images with 
very few exceptions. The law’s criteria are behavioral—actions and mental states. If the 
finding of any test or measurement of behavior is contradicted by actual behavioral evidence, 
then we must believe the behavioral evidence because it is more direct and probative of the 
law’s behavioral criteria. For example, if a criminal defendant behaves rationally in a wide 
variety of circumstances, the defendant is rational even if his or her brain appears structurally 
or functionally abnormal. In contrast, if the defendant is clearly psychotic, then a potentially 
legally-relevant rationality problem exists even if his brain looks normal. We might think that 
neuroscience would be especially helpful in distinguishing the truth in “gray area” cases in 
which the behavioral evidence is unclear. For example, is the defendant simply very 
grandiose or actually delusional? But unfortunately, the neuroscience helps us least when we 
need it the most, and if the behavior is clear, we don’t need it at all. 
 In sum, despite major advances in behavioral neuroscience, the field has little to 
contribute to law at present. In the future, as the science develops, it will surely make 
contributions to legal policy and adjudication, but the law’s underlying assumptions about 
human behavior and its concept of the person will remain largely unchanged. 
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